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## NEW BOOKS REVIEWED

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LET US HAVE PEACE, and Other Addresses. By Darwin P. Kingsley, president of the New York Life Insurance Company. New York: published by the Company.

Mr. Kingsley reveals a large and true conception of the problem of which he mainly treats in his newly published volume of collected addresses, when he calls the sphere of international relations a "lawless overworld, of which every sovereignty and every citizen of that sovereignty is a part." "This overworld," he continues, "is as certainly every man's country as the ether is the enveloping element of the solar system." The thought has seldom been better put, or the problem more suggestively formulated. What task could give greater inspiration, what glorious attempt could seem more certain of success, than the extension of that civilization which we undoubtedly possess as nations into the larger region of world politics?

There would seem to be but one serious obstacle. "*Unconditioned sovereignty*," declares the author, "*was the fundamental error of civilization*." Only do away with that, by the obvious method—federation—and all will be well.

That there is ultimate truth in this large and simple view of things, who that is sane and hopeful can doubt? Nationality, especially in its unconditioned form, is certainly not the alpha and omega of civilization; its gradual decline, its merging with a sentiment of world-patriotism, has been cautiously prophesied by so conservative an authority as J. Holland Rose. To Mr. Kingsley, however, unconditioned sovereignty seems merely an anomaly, an illogical survival from the dark ages, a mistaken doctrine on which our civilization was somehow arbitrarily *founded*, rather than one of the forms that it has assumed in the course of its evolution. As intelligent, civilized beings, he seems to urge, let us lose no time in correcting the original error. All of which may be quite convincing if we agree to regard the doctrine of unlimited sovereignty as the cause, instead of, what it actually was, a necessary antecedent condition of the war.

Mr. Kingsley is, happily, no pacifist: on the contrary he urges national preparedness as a prime duty. Nor is he a League of Nations Utopian. Yet his mode of reasoning occasionally suggests the logic employed by the idealists of both these schools. In high-minded disgust at what seems to him an obsolete and hateful doctrine, a doctrine as contrary to civilized ethics as it is at variance with the principles of

life insurance—that practical application of human brotherhood—he seems inclined sometimes to place the emphasis on the wrong point—to stress civilization's mistake, rather than Germany's evil will as the *causa causans* of the war.

Thus, adopting the point of view of G. Lowes Dickenson and others, Mr. Kingsley writes: "Morally Germany may have been wrong, because preparation meant war; morally other nations were about equally wrong and in addition they were illogical, because while they flinched from the brutality of the German's logic, they did little to answer it—they made only pitiful attempts to sweep lawlessness out of international affairs. Asserting after a fashion the brotherhood of man, they did nothing effective or serious, looking to its establishment. The German in effect boldly denied the brotherhood of man, asserted the superiority of his own civilization and planned to impose that civilization on the whole world. The German may have been wrong; but he stood up to his logic." It seems unfortunate that a thoroughly patriotic citizen should feel constrained, in his honest zeal for peace, to write what sounds in part so much like the native German apologetics.

It may be plausibly maintained, on the contrary, that the nations, in 1914, were on the whole developing in the direction of peace, and that, but for Germany's deliberate crime, they might have continued to approach realization of Mazzini's conception of nationality—a nationality intense in its love of independence, but broadly human, if not altruistic.

Just how, again, are we to interpret such ringing words as these: "Human life is worth more than all the Republics, Kaisers, Kings, and Czars." Unquestionably, there is here intended no hint that a republic may not be under certain circumstances worth dying for; but the eloquent pronouncement, like those of certain well-intentioned pacifists, seems to blur a fundamental truth for the sake of a forceful generalization.

As for Mr. Kingsley's panacea for international ills—federation—no one would be justified in calling it a mere nostrum. In spite of disillusionment over the work of the Peace Conference, Tennyson's well-worn lines about the parliament of man still read, to most persons, as authentic prophesy. But it is proper to call attention to the fact that Mr. Kingsley's advocacy of world federation rests heavily on the incomplete analogy between the American colonies as they were in 1789 and the nations of the world as they are in 1919. Analogy is often suggestive; it may afford a clue to the right solution of a problem; but it is of all forms of argument the least convincing. On the strength, largely, of analogy, one is hardly prepared to admit that the way to become truly democratic is to join in forming "a Federation (not Confederation)" of the Anglo-Saxon world, which would "almost certainly come to include—perhaps before its completion—France, Holland, Switzerland, probably the Scandinavian Countries and Spain, and possibly some of the Republics of South America." One does not know what to think of a world state made up of elements so diverse and so scattered. Japan, one is inclined to suggest, might as well be included, while we are about it! Moreover, the dangers inherent in

such an arrangement, and in the approaches to it through alliances, are passed over by Mr. Kingsley with scant notice. To believe that the world can be made peaceful and democratic by a huge federation requires almost more faith than to believe that men have now become so convinced of the wickedness of war that they will never again—federation or no federation, league or no league—precipitate another Armageddon.

Progress, as a matter of fact, is usually the outcome of a slow and half-conscious process, as the whole history of English democracy goes to show. It is seldom much helped by attempts at immediate and comprehensive solutions of all existing difficulties. But the hasteners of evolution will not have it so!

Is Mr. Kingsley, after all, one of these, or is he merely a philosopher? On the whole he seems to side with the anticipators of the millennium: he seems to intend his theory of alliances as an immediate and practical programme. It is important, however, to make a clear distinction between the persons who urge that if the world generally could but see as few thinkers of superior enlightenment see, federation, or some other scheme, would certainly work, and those who urge that, the advantages of the preferred plan being self-evident, or nearly so, the world must necessarily adopt it as soon as a strong initiative is taken in some quarter. The former merely exhort; the latter propose action. The former, while they help mankind by clarifying and strengthening its hopes, sometimes arouse impatience as being rather futile; the latter are not infrequently overconfident. Quite unlike either, is the statesman who divines the next step that truly ought to be taken along the road of progress.

**LAW AND THE FAMILY.** By Robert Grant, Judge of the Probate Court, Boston. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

To be something of a philosopher would seem to be almost necessary for a complete Probate Judge. Judge Grant is a philosopher in more senses than one. Not only is he able to see with a certain steadiness and wholesomeness the not unimportant phases of life that are specially exposed to his view, but he has a considerable endowment of that unostentatious humor which combines readily with a nice valuation of factors in human conduct and an unillusioned but charitable view of human nature. Judge Grant is never wholly serious except when he is talking about really menacing abuses, and he is not depressing even then.

A book about the kind of law that touches most of us most nearly, a book written by one who is not only an expert in that kind of law, but an accomplished essayist,\* ought to be worth reading; and in Judge Grant's *Law and the Family* one is not disappointed. From the somewhat Hudibrastic verses that form the foreword of the volume to the serious question propounded at the end of the last chapter—a ques-

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\*Robert Grant has written *The Convictions of a Grandfather*, *The Chip-pendales*, *The Undercurrent*, *The Art of Living*, *The Reflections of a Married Man*, and other stories and essays.